Minority Retort: The White House Thinks Black: "Sunday, March 13, 2005
The White House Thinks Black
Stanley Crouch's piece in the LA Times shows how the Republican outreach into the black community can return the black community to its civil rights roots. In those days, the black leadership made a concscious effort to be non-partisan, knowing the problems of color transcended political parties. Today, Crouch, points out, the inheritors of that mantle are tied at the hip with the Democratic Party. He warns: 'If the civil rights establishment doesn't step away from its Democratic partisanship and make itself more open to the values of both political parties, its relevance will continue to erode.'"
A collection of opinionated commentaries on culture, politics and religion compiled predominantly from an American viewpoint but tempered by a global vision. My Armwood Opinion Youtube Channel @ YouTube I have a Jazz Blog @ Jazz and a Technology Blog @ Technology. I have a Human Rights Blog @ Law
Friday, March 25, 2005
washingtonpost.com: China's Law On Taiwan Backfires
washingtonpost.com: China's Law On Taiwan Backfires: "washingtonpost.com
washingtonpost.com
China's Law On Taiwan Backfires
Anti-Secession Measure Hurts Efforts Abroad
By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, March 24, 2005; Page A13
BEIJING, March 23 -- China has paid a price abroad for enacting its controversial anti-secession law, spoiling a strategy for relations with Taiwan, undercutting a drive to end Europe's arms embargo and reinforcing unease over the growth in Chinese military power.
Although the law did little more than codify long-standing policy, Taiwan and countries around the world have focused on the vow to use "non-peaceful means" to prevent Taiwanese independence. In the 10 days since the legislation passed, this focus has emphasized the image of a China willing to risk war across the Taiwan Strait, frustrating Chinese diplomatic efforts to depict the nation's rise as non-threatening.
In pushing forward with the law, President Hu Jintao and his government were weighing domestic considerations as well as foreign policy. Hu, who analysts say is still solidifying his power, was eager to be seen at home as a tough leader on the emotionally charged Taiwan issue. Work on the law began last fall, they noted, as Hu was taking over as military leader from former president Jiang Zemin.
Hu and other leaders have portrayed the new law as a needed check on Taiwan's independence activists -- including President Chen Shui-bian. Without the law to brake him, officials have said, Chen could take one step too many, producing a military conflict nobody wants.
When China began talking about the law last fall, the analysts recalled, Chen was announcing plans to make several changes regarded here as highly provocative. They included changing the name of state-owned enterprises to emphasize "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China" and inserting the name "Taiwan" in official correspondence from the Foreign Ministry.
Against that background, the Chinese government professed surprise at the degree of negative international reaction to the law during meetings Sunday with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, according to sources with knowledge of the talks. The State Department publicly criticized the law as unhelpful. While in Beijing, the sources said, Rice urged leaders to take conciliatory steps to improve the atmosphere soured by the new legislation.
President Bush and other U.S. leaders already were warning that China's fast-paced military modernization risked tipping the balance of power around Taiwan, putting the United States at greater peril if it intervened to defend the self-governing island. With the anti-secession law's threat of military force, those warnings gained urgency; they were repeated several times by Rice during her Asian tour.
Maintaining smooth relations with the United States has become a pillar of China's diplomacy. But the anti-secession law, by feeding the fears of those in Washington who see China as a military adversary, seemed to push relations in the opposite direction.
The threat of force undermined a similar campaign to portray China in neighboring Asian countries as a reliable neighbor whose peaceful rise is not to be feared. This effort, underway for several years, has gained wide acceptance, particularly in Southeast Asia, as China's booming economy and expanding trade give it greater influence in the region.
The image of a peacefully growing nation also was important in China's drive to gain a lifting of Europe's arms embargo. The Beijing government seemed to be on the verge of success despite U.S. opposition. But since the Taiwan law passed March 14, the atmosphere has changed: U.S. arguments have gained new force, and the consensus in Europe for lifting the ban has unraveled.
A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said Tuesday that there should be no connection between the new law and the European arms embargo. But in European capitals, the link was already made.
The new law also clouded what had been a period of improving atmospherics between China and Taiwan, putting off indefinitely several proposals for better airline and commercial links.
Since a setback in Dec. 11 legislative elections, Chen had played down his most confrontational plans, including the name change for state enterprises. China and Taiwan then agreed on direct charter flights for Chinese New Year visits last month, and China had proposed talks about more flights this spring.
A Taiwan specialist in Beijing who was involved in drafting the anti-secession law said Hu's government had concluded from the Dec. 11 election results that many Taiwanese, even those who may support independence, were tiring of Chen's confrontational style, fearful that it could lead to war. As a result, he said, the government decided to cultivate a friendly image on the island, proposing direct cargo flights to help Taiwan's businesses and increased fruit and vegetable imports to help Taiwanese farms.
But the anti-secession law was working its way through the bureaucracy.
Since its passage, Taiwan has halted action on the initiatives, which Chen qualified as "petty" in the face of what his Democratic Progressive Party called a trigger for war in the new law. Chen's group also has announced plans for a million-man march Saturday to dramatize Taiwanese anger at the law. Opinion polls on the island, meanwhile, indicate increased support for the president's views.
washingtonpost.com
China's Law On Taiwan Backfires
Anti-Secession Measure Hurts Efforts Abroad
By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, March 24, 2005; Page A13
BEIJING, March 23 -- China has paid a price abroad for enacting its controversial anti-secession law, spoiling a strategy for relations with Taiwan, undercutting a drive to end Europe's arms embargo and reinforcing unease over the growth in Chinese military power.
Although the law did little more than codify long-standing policy, Taiwan and countries around the world have focused on the vow to use "non-peaceful means" to prevent Taiwanese independence. In the 10 days since the legislation passed, this focus has emphasized the image of a China willing to risk war across the Taiwan Strait, frustrating Chinese diplomatic efforts to depict the nation's rise as non-threatening.
In pushing forward with the law, President Hu Jintao and his government were weighing domestic considerations as well as foreign policy. Hu, who analysts say is still solidifying his power, was eager to be seen at home as a tough leader on the emotionally charged Taiwan issue. Work on the law began last fall, they noted, as Hu was taking over as military leader from former president Jiang Zemin.
Hu and other leaders have portrayed the new law as a needed check on Taiwan's independence activists -- including President Chen Shui-bian. Without the law to brake him, officials have said, Chen could take one step too many, producing a military conflict nobody wants.
When China began talking about the law last fall, the analysts recalled, Chen was announcing plans to make several changes regarded here as highly provocative. They included changing the name of state-owned enterprises to emphasize "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China" and inserting the name "Taiwan" in official correspondence from the Foreign Ministry.
Against that background, the Chinese government professed surprise at the degree of negative international reaction to the law during meetings Sunday with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, according to sources with knowledge of the talks. The State Department publicly criticized the law as unhelpful. While in Beijing, the sources said, Rice urged leaders to take conciliatory steps to improve the atmosphere soured by the new legislation.
President Bush and other U.S. leaders already were warning that China's fast-paced military modernization risked tipping the balance of power around Taiwan, putting the United States at greater peril if it intervened to defend the self-governing island. With the anti-secession law's threat of military force, those warnings gained urgency; they were repeated several times by Rice during her Asian tour.
Maintaining smooth relations with the United States has become a pillar of China's diplomacy. But the anti-secession law, by feeding the fears of those in Washington who see China as a military adversary, seemed to push relations in the opposite direction.
The threat of force undermined a similar campaign to portray China in neighboring Asian countries as a reliable neighbor whose peaceful rise is not to be feared. This effort, underway for several years, has gained wide acceptance, particularly in Southeast Asia, as China's booming economy and expanding trade give it greater influence in the region.
The image of a peacefully growing nation also was important in China's drive to gain a lifting of Europe's arms embargo. The Beijing government seemed to be on the verge of success despite U.S. opposition. But since the Taiwan law passed March 14, the atmosphere has changed: U.S. arguments have gained new force, and the consensus in Europe for lifting the ban has unraveled.
A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said Tuesday that there should be no connection between the new law and the European arms embargo. But in European capitals, the link was already made.
The new law also clouded what had been a period of improving atmospherics between China and Taiwan, putting off indefinitely several proposals for better airline and commercial links.
Since a setback in Dec. 11 legislative elections, Chen had played down his most confrontational plans, including the name change for state enterprises. China and Taiwan then agreed on direct charter flights for Chinese New Year visits last month, and China had proposed talks about more flights this spring.
A Taiwan specialist in Beijing who was involved in drafting the anti-secession law said Hu's government had concluded from the Dec. 11 election results that many Taiwanese, even those who may support independence, were tiring of Chen's confrontational style, fearful that it could lead to war. As a result, he said, the government decided to cultivate a friendly image on the island, proposing direct cargo flights to help Taiwan's businesses and increased fruit and vegetable imports to help Taiwanese farms.
But the anti-secession law was working its way through the bureaucracy.
Since its passage, Taiwan has halted action on the initiatives, which Chen qualified as "petty" in the face of what his Democratic Progressive Party called a trigger for war in the new law. Chen's group also has announced plans for a million-man march Saturday to dramatize Taiwanese anger at the law. Opinion polls on the island, meanwhile, indicate increased support for the president's views.
Monday, March 21, 2005
The New York Times > Opinion > That Scalia Charm
The New York Times > Opinion > That Scalia Charm: "March 21, 2005
March 21, 2005
That Scalia Charm
Some court-watchers say Justice Antonin Scalia is on a "charm offensive" to become the next chief justice. Then he must have been taking the day off when he gave a speech last week and lashed out at the Supreme Court's recent ruling striking down the death penalty for juveniles, and at the idea of a "living Constitution." There is nothing charming about his view that judges have no business considering the constitutionality of aspects of the death penalty, or that the Constitution should be frozen in time.
Justice Scalia dissented bitterly in this month's juvenile death penalty case. Reasonable minds may ask, as he did, whether the majority opinion relied too heavily on the norms of international law in deciding what punishment does not meet modern standards of decency. But Justice Scalia disagreed not merely with the majority's conclusion that offenders cannot be executed for crimes committed when they were under the age of 18, but with the very fact that the court was even considering the question. "By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the nation?" he asked.
In his speech last week at the Woodrow Wilson Center, he continued on the same theme. He attacked the idea of a "living Constitution," one that evolves with modern sensibilities, which the Supreme Court has long recognized in its jurisprudence, and of "evolving notions of decency," a standard the court uses to interpret the Eighth Amendment prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" in cases like those involving the death penalty.
In drafting the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, the Founders chose to use broad phrases that necessarily require interpretation. Since its landmark 1803 ruling in Marbury v. Madison, the court has held that it is the final word on the Constitution's meaning. In the recent juvenile death penalty case, the court was doing its job of determining what one such phrase, "cruel and unusual punishment," means today.
The implications of Justice Scalia's remarks are sweeping. Many of the most central principles of American constitutional law - from the right to a court-appointed lawyer to the right to buy contraception - have emerged from the court's evolving sense of the meaning of constitutional clauses. Justice Scalia seems to be suggesting that many, or perhaps all, of these rights should exist only at the whim of legislatures.
Justice Scalia may believe that by repeating his radical views enough times, the nation will grow accustomed to them. But his approach would mean throwing out much of the nation's existing constitutional law, and depriving Americans of basic rights. Justice Scalia's campaign to be the next chief justice, if it is that, is a timely reminder of why he would be a disastrous choice for the job.
March 21, 2005
That Scalia Charm
Some court-watchers say Justice Antonin Scalia is on a "charm offensive" to become the next chief justice. Then he must have been taking the day off when he gave a speech last week and lashed out at the Supreme Court's recent ruling striking down the death penalty for juveniles, and at the idea of a "living Constitution." There is nothing charming about his view that judges have no business considering the constitutionality of aspects of the death penalty, or that the Constitution should be frozen in time.
Justice Scalia dissented bitterly in this month's juvenile death penalty case. Reasonable minds may ask, as he did, whether the majority opinion relied too heavily on the norms of international law in deciding what punishment does not meet modern standards of decency. But Justice Scalia disagreed not merely with the majority's conclusion that offenders cannot be executed for crimes committed when they were under the age of 18, but with the very fact that the court was even considering the question. "By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the nation?" he asked.
In his speech last week at the Woodrow Wilson Center, he continued on the same theme. He attacked the idea of a "living Constitution," one that evolves with modern sensibilities, which the Supreme Court has long recognized in its jurisprudence, and of "evolving notions of decency," a standard the court uses to interpret the Eighth Amendment prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" in cases like those involving the death penalty.
In drafting the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, the Founders chose to use broad phrases that necessarily require interpretation. Since its landmark 1803 ruling in Marbury v. Madison, the court has held that it is the final word on the Constitution's meaning. In the recent juvenile death penalty case, the court was doing its job of determining what one such phrase, "cruel and unusual punishment," means today.
The implications of Justice Scalia's remarks are sweeping. Many of the most central principles of American constitutional law - from the right to a court-appointed lawyer to the right to buy contraception - have emerged from the court's evolving sense of the meaning of constitutional clauses. Justice Scalia seems to be suggesting that many, or perhaps all, of these rights should exist only at the whim of legislatures.
Justice Scalia may believe that by repeating his radical views enough times, the nation will grow accustomed to them. But his approach would mean throwing out much of the nation's existing constitutional law, and depriving Americans of basic rights. Justice Scalia's campaign to be the next chief justice, if it is that, is a timely reminder of why he would be a disastrous choice for the job.
Saturday, March 12, 2005
The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: New Signs on the Arab Street
The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: New Signs on the Arab Street
The New York Times
March 13, 2005
OP-ED COLUMNIST
New Signs on the Arab Street
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
From Baghdad to Beirut, the Middle East has seen a series of unprecedented popular demonstrations for democracy. There were, however, two street protests in December that got virtually no coverage, but were just as important, if not more. One took place in the Egyptian Nile Delta town of Mahalla and the other in the Suez Canal city of Ismailiya. Both of these raucous Egyptian demonstrations, which involved marches, strikes, denunciations of the government and appeals to Parliament, were triggered by President Hosni Mubarak's decision to sign the first substantial trade agreement with Israel since Camp David. That decision brought Egyptian workers from both areas into the streets. They were furious. They were enraged. Why?
They were not included in the new trade deal with Israel.
Now, that's a new Middle East. On Dec. 14, Egypt, Israel and the U.S. signed an accord setting up three Qualified Industrial Zones (Q.I.Z.'s) in Egypt. The deal stipulated the following: Any Egyptian company operating in one of these Q.I.Z.'s that imports from an Israeli company at least 11.7 percent of the parts, materials or services that go into the Egyptian company's final product can then export that finished product to the U.S. duty free. This is a big deal for Egypt, which, unlike Jordan and Israel, does not have a free-trade treaty with the U.S. As part of the accord, the U.S. named Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said the three Q.I.Z.'s. It had to be limited to only three municipalities so that the U.S. would not be swamped with Egyptian exports - hence the protests from the two big Egyptian manufacturing centers that were left out.
According to Rashid Mohamed Rashid, Egypt's impressive new minister of foreign trade, 397 Egyptian companies have already signed up to participate in the Q.I.Z. program, most of them small and medium-size firms. Many of these Egyptian companies have already gone to Israel to forge deals with Israeli suppliers or started work with Israeli partners to identify export markets in the U.S. Some Israeli companies are setting up shop in the Egyptian Q.I.Z.'s to provide services right on the spot.
There are a lot of messages in this bottle. One is that if you create a real opportunity for Israeli and Egyptian businesses to interact profitably, not only will Egyptians ignore the protests of the old Nasserites who want to boycott Israel, they will seize the opportunity and protest mightily if they are kept out.
Another message: This "Baghdad spring" will not blossom into sustainable democracy in any of these Arab states without a broader middle class and civil society institutions to support it. For too long, U.S. foreign policy was based on buying stability in the Arab world by supporting dictators, who destroyed all the independent press, political parties, unions, real private sector and civil society in their countries - everything except the mosque. Iraq is the starkest example of this, which is why democratization there will take time.
Looking at Eastern Europe on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, said Emanuele Ottolenghi, a lecturer on the Middle East at Oxford, "we could have predicted which countries would have an easy transition to democracy and which ones not." Countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, which had a history of liberal institutions and free markets that had been suppressed by communism, quickly flourished. Others farther east, which did not have such institutions in their past and were starting from scratch - Bulgaria, Romania and the former Soviet republics - have struggled since the fall of the wall.
The same will be true in the Middle East, where democracy will not just spring up because autocrats fall down. It will arise only if these countries develop, among other things, export-oriented private sectors, which can be the foundation for a vibrant middle class that is not dependent upon the state for contracts and has a vital interest in an open economy, a free press and its own political parties. The development of such a private sector was crucial in democratizing Taiwan and South Korea.
That is why, beyond Iraq, America's priorities should be to sign a free-trade agreement with Egypt - which would help foster an export-oriented private sector there just when President Mubarak has signaled an end to 50 years of military rule - and get Syria out of Lebanon, which would free the dynamic private sector that already exists there, but has been stifled by Syria. Free Lebanon and free Egypt's economy and they will change the rest of the Middle East for us - for free.
The New York Times
March 13, 2005
OP-ED COLUMNIST
New Signs on the Arab Street
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
From Baghdad to Beirut, the Middle East has seen a series of unprecedented popular demonstrations for democracy. There were, however, two street protests in December that got virtually no coverage, but were just as important, if not more. One took place in the Egyptian Nile Delta town of Mahalla and the other in the Suez Canal city of Ismailiya. Both of these raucous Egyptian demonstrations, which involved marches, strikes, denunciations of the government and appeals to Parliament, were triggered by President Hosni Mubarak's decision to sign the first substantial trade agreement with Israel since Camp David. That decision brought Egyptian workers from both areas into the streets. They were furious. They were enraged. Why?
They were not included in the new trade deal with Israel.
Now, that's a new Middle East. On Dec. 14, Egypt, Israel and the U.S. signed an accord setting up three Qualified Industrial Zones (Q.I.Z.'s) in Egypt. The deal stipulated the following: Any Egyptian company operating in one of these Q.I.Z.'s that imports from an Israeli company at least 11.7 percent of the parts, materials or services that go into the Egyptian company's final product can then export that finished product to the U.S. duty free. This is a big deal for Egypt, which, unlike Jordan and Israel, does not have a free-trade treaty with the U.S. As part of the accord, the U.S. named Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said the three Q.I.Z.'s. It had to be limited to only three municipalities so that the U.S. would not be swamped with Egyptian exports - hence the protests from the two big Egyptian manufacturing centers that were left out.
According to Rashid Mohamed Rashid, Egypt's impressive new minister of foreign trade, 397 Egyptian companies have already signed up to participate in the Q.I.Z. program, most of them small and medium-size firms. Many of these Egyptian companies have already gone to Israel to forge deals with Israeli suppliers or started work with Israeli partners to identify export markets in the U.S. Some Israeli companies are setting up shop in the Egyptian Q.I.Z.'s to provide services right on the spot.
There are a lot of messages in this bottle. One is that if you create a real opportunity for Israeli and Egyptian businesses to interact profitably, not only will Egyptians ignore the protests of the old Nasserites who want to boycott Israel, they will seize the opportunity and protest mightily if they are kept out.
Another message: This "Baghdad spring" will not blossom into sustainable democracy in any of these Arab states without a broader middle class and civil society institutions to support it. For too long, U.S. foreign policy was based on buying stability in the Arab world by supporting dictators, who destroyed all the independent press, political parties, unions, real private sector and civil society in their countries - everything except the mosque. Iraq is the starkest example of this, which is why democratization there will take time.
Looking at Eastern Europe on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, said Emanuele Ottolenghi, a lecturer on the Middle East at Oxford, "we could have predicted which countries would have an easy transition to democracy and which ones not." Countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, which had a history of liberal institutions and free markets that had been suppressed by communism, quickly flourished. Others farther east, which did not have such institutions in their past and were starting from scratch - Bulgaria, Romania and the former Soviet republics - have struggled since the fall of the wall.
The same will be true in the Middle East, where democracy will not just spring up because autocrats fall down. It will arise only if these countries develop, among other things, export-oriented private sectors, which can be the foundation for a vibrant middle class that is not dependent upon the state for contracts and has a vital interest in an open economy, a free press and its own political parties. The development of such a private sector was crucial in democratizing Taiwan and South Korea.
That is why, beyond Iraq, America's priorities should be to sign a free-trade agreement with Egypt - which would help foster an export-oriented private sector there just when President Mubarak has signaled an end to 50 years of military rule - and get Syria out of Lebanon, which would free the dynamic private sector that already exists there, but has been stifled by Syria. Free Lebanon and free Egypt's economy and they will change the rest of the Middle East for us - for free.
Friday, March 11, 2005
Taipei Times - archives > Taiwan's fate difficult to predict
Taipei Times - archives
By Nat Bellocchi 白樂崎
Thursday, Mar 10, 2005,Page 8
`The two men's agreement ... was an important step, but like all agreements under these circumstances, is sufficiently ambiguous to allow flexible interpretation if needed in the future.'
In today's world, globalization is seen primarily as a process of economic integration, which inevitably will be linked to closer political and security integration as well. But the cross-strait relationship has been challenging that conventional wisdom.
The growing economic ties between Taiwan and China, for example, have brought the sides closer together, but the political and security relationship has seen them drift further apart. Still, in both Washington and Taiwan, recent events have reawakened the conventional wisdom on globalization's political effects. That may turn out to be true. But by overhyping a warming of political as well as economic relations between the two sides, we may be too quickly avoiding reality.
The first transfer of power in Taiwan's government in 2000 was, inevitably, a difficult transition. The new governing party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had insufficient talent for running a government and inherited a bureaucracy that was, like the previous government, virtually indistinguishable from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). It faced in the KMT an opposition party that had no experience being in the opposition, and saw its major objective as not just to defeat the new governing party, but to destroy it.
This situation clearly -- and predictably -- led to many errors. By the end of that first term, there were still many laws from the previous authoritarian government to be changed, many rules and traditions still to be addressed, a reluctance to fully utilize the bureaucracy, and a lack of effective communication with the people of Taiwan and with foreign governments. Taking all this into consideration, the conventional wisdom on the effects of globalization may yet be correct.
This overlooks -- or perhaps deliberately avoids -- the progress that have been made in this period despite the errors and the obstacles which Taiwan faces. The government has effectively encouraged a much greater involvement by voters not only through political parties but in the growth of non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement in political, civil and cultural matters.
Despite the political slogans and sensationalist media on all sides, ethnic differences have diminished, helped in great measure by the rise of new, born-in-Taiwan generations. And though this might not make China happy, there has been a much greater consensus on what the people want as Taiwan's identity. This is demonstrated both in countless polls and in the rapidly-closing gap between the major political parties on the identity issue.
It was clear, after the presidential elections in both the US and Taiwan, and the legislative elections in Taiwan resulted in little change; that another four-year delay in progress on the economy, cross-strait relations, and domestic welfare was unacceptable to the voters. Thus, we see the recent effort by the DPP to experiment in cooperation with opposition parties.
The most logical cooperation for the DPP would probably be with the KMT, which has both considerable expertise in governance, and also now a majority of "local" members (including not only native Taiwanese, but young Mainlanders as well) whose preferences, especially on sovereignty issues, are very close to those of the DPP. For the time being, however, the KMT is in the midst of choosing new leadership.
Deciding now on a cooperative arrangement with the third-largest party, the People First Party (PFP), had advantages in timing for the governing party, and in bolstering the PFP, which had suffered a setback in the legislative elections. The meeting between President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) brought considerable anguish for members of both the governing and opposition parties. The two men's agreement at the meeting was an important step, but like all agreements under these circumstances, is sufficiently ambiguous to allow flexible interpretation if needed in the future.
Though ambiguity is not exactly unknown in Washington, it's not given its due when used by others elsewhere. Likewise, media hype coming from Taiwan also seems to be taken more seriously. Neither ambiguity or media hype can be ignored, but both should be weighed realistically. The US, rightly in this case, probably sees this as a domestic issue and one that might even reduce cross-strait tensions.
To see this as a result of the legislative elections which were a serious setback for the governing party and a popular rejection of the path the government was taking on the identity issue. In this view, the momentum is now moving back to the middle ground. That's not impossible, but it's much too soon to come to that conclusion.
The legislative elections were important, and they clearly made it necessary for the governing party to shift gears to address changed circumstances. But there are other factors that will have an important influence on where Taiwan will go from here. The "anti-secession" law that China is now preparing to approve has already had a negative influence on the Taiwanese public. It is still uncertain how Taiwan will react when the law is approved, and what tensions will result.
Another important factor will be the KMT's decision on its next chairman. The KMT is no longer the governing party, and though it may not have the clout it once had in the legislature (the PFP will not automatically side with the KMT on some issues as a result of its arrangement with the DPP), it can do considerable harm in blocking the government's legislative wish list.
But the additional 12 legislative seats the KMT gained in the last election has also increased the number of "local" members. That means there isn't a wide chasm between the majority of members and the governing party on identity issues. There is little difference on the issue of unification with China. Some KMT members are even close to the DPP's pro-independence stance.
Despite pressure from Taiwanese business interests or China's new "anti-secession" law, Taiwan will continue pressing for international recognition as a country. If the momentum and the direction that might have been caused by the legislative election materializes, it is not likely to be a sharp turn.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
By Nat Bellocchi 白樂崎
Thursday, Mar 10, 2005,Page 8
`The two men's agreement ... was an important step, but like all agreements under these circumstances, is sufficiently ambiguous to allow flexible interpretation if needed in the future.'
In today's world, globalization is seen primarily as a process of economic integration, which inevitably will be linked to closer political and security integration as well. But the cross-strait relationship has been challenging that conventional wisdom.
The growing economic ties between Taiwan and China, for example, have brought the sides closer together, but the political and security relationship has seen them drift further apart. Still, in both Washington and Taiwan, recent events have reawakened the conventional wisdom on globalization's political effects. That may turn out to be true. But by overhyping a warming of political as well as economic relations between the two sides, we may be too quickly avoiding reality.
The first transfer of power in Taiwan's government in 2000 was, inevitably, a difficult transition. The new governing party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had insufficient talent for running a government and inherited a bureaucracy that was, like the previous government, virtually indistinguishable from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). It faced in the KMT an opposition party that had no experience being in the opposition, and saw its major objective as not just to defeat the new governing party, but to destroy it.
This situation clearly -- and predictably -- led to many errors. By the end of that first term, there were still many laws from the previous authoritarian government to be changed, many rules and traditions still to be addressed, a reluctance to fully utilize the bureaucracy, and a lack of effective communication with the people of Taiwan and with foreign governments. Taking all this into consideration, the conventional wisdom on the effects of globalization may yet be correct.
This overlooks -- or perhaps deliberately avoids -- the progress that have been made in this period despite the errors and the obstacles which Taiwan faces. The government has effectively encouraged a much greater involvement by voters not only through political parties but in the growth of non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement in political, civil and cultural matters.
Despite the political slogans and sensationalist media on all sides, ethnic differences have diminished, helped in great measure by the rise of new, born-in-Taiwan generations. And though this might not make China happy, there has been a much greater consensus on what the people want as Taiwan's identity. This is demonstrated both in countless polls and in the rapidly-closing gap between the major political parties on the identity issue.
It was clear, after the presidential elections in both the US and Taiwan, and the legislative elections in Taiwan resulted in little change; that another four-year delay in progress on the economy, cross-strait relations, and domestic welfare was unacceptable to the voters. Thus, we see the recent effort by the DPP to experiment in cooperation with opposition parties.
The most logical cooperation for the DPP would probably be with the KMT, which has both considerable expertise in governance, and also now a majority of "local" members (including not only native Taiwanese, but young Mainlanders as well) whose preferences, especially on sovereignty issues, are very close to those of the DPP. For the time being, however, the KMT is in the midst of choosing new leadership.
Deciding now on a cooperative arrangement with the third-largest party, the People First Party (PFP), had advantages in timing for the governing party, and in bolstering the PFP, which had suffered a setback in the legislative elections. The meeting between President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) brought considerable anguish for members of both the governing and opposition parties. The two men's agreement at the meeting was an important step, but like all agreements under these circumstances, is sufficiently ambiguous to allow flexible interpretation if needed in the future.
Though ambiguity is not exactly unknown in Washington, it's not given its due when used by others elsewhere. Likewise, media hype coming from Taiwan also seems to be taken more seriously. Neither ambiguity or media hype can be ignored, but both should be weighed realistically. The US, rightly in this case, probably sees this as a domestic issue and one that might even reduce cross-strait tensions.
To see this as a result of the legislative elections which were a serious setback for the governing party and a popular rejection of the path the government was taking on the identity issue. In this view, the momentum is now moving back to the middle ground. That's not impossible, but it's much too soon to come to that conclusion.
The legislative elections were important, and they clearly made it necessary for the governing party to shift gears to address changed circumstances. But there are other factors that will have an important influence on where Taiwan will go from here. The "anti-secession" law that China is now preparing to approve has already had a negative influence on the Taiwanese public. It is still uncertain how Taiwan will react when the law is approved, and what tensions will result.
Another important factor will be the KMT's decision on its next chairman. The KMT is no longer the governing party, and though it may not have the clout it once had in the legislature (the PFP will not automatically side with the KMT on some issues as a result of its arrangement with the DPP), it can do considerable harm in blocking the government's legislative wish list.
But the additional 12 legislative seats the KMT gained in the last election has also increased the number of "local" members. That means there isn't a wide chasm between the majority of members and the governing party on identity issues. There is little difference on the issue of unification with China. Some KMT members are even close to the DPP's pro-independence stance.
Despite pressure from Taiwanese business interests or China's new "anti-secession" law, Taiwan will continue pressing for international recognition as a country. If the momentum and the direction that might have been caused by the legislative election materializes, it is not likely to be a sharp turn.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
Wednesday, March 09, 2005
The New York Times > Opinion > Editorial: The World According to Bolton
The New York Times > Opinion > Editorial: The World According to Bolton
The New York Times
March 9, 2005
EDITORIAL
The World According to Bolton
On Monday, President Bush nominated John Bolton, an outspoken critic of multinational institutions and a former Jesse Helms protégé, to be the representative to the United Nations. We won't make the case that this is a terrible choice at a critical time. We can let Mr. Bolton do it for us by examining how things might look if he had his way:
The United States could resolve international disputes after vigorous debate with ... itself. In an interview in 2000 on National Public Radio, Mr. Bolton told Juan Williams, "If I were redoing the Security Council today, I'd have one permanent member because that's the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world."
"And that one member would be, John Bolton?" Mr. Williams queried.
"The United States," Mr. Bolton replied.
America could stop worrying about China ... In 1999, when he was senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Bolton wrote a column in The Weekly Standard advocating that the United States just go ahead and give Taiwan diplomatic recognition, despite the fact that this purely symbolic gesture was a point on which China had repeatedly threatened to go to war. He made this argument: "Diplomatic recognition of Taiwan would be just the kind of demonstration of U.S. leadership that the region needs and that many of its people hope for. ... The notion that China would actually respond with force is a fantasy, albeit one the Communist leaders welcome and encourage in the West."
... and North Korea. In 1999, Mr. Bolton told The Los Angeles Times: "A sounder U.S. policy would start by making it clear to the North that we are indifferent to whether we ever have 'normal' diplomatic relations with it, and that achieving that goal is entirely in their interests, not ours. We should also make clear that diplomatic normalization with the U.S. is only going to come when North Korea becomes a normal country."
U.N. dues? What U.N. dues? In 1997, Mr. Bolton wrote in a column in The Wall Street Journal that the United States isn't legally bound to pay its United Nations dues. "Treaties are 'law' only for U.S. domestic purposes," he said. "In their international operations, treaties are simply 'political' obligations."
And forget about the International Criminal Court. In 2000, Mr. Bolton told the House International Relations Committee: "Support for the International Criminal Court concept is based largely on emotional appeals to an abstract ideal of an international judicial system unsupported by any meaningful evidence and running contrary to sound principles of international crisis resolution."
We certainly look forward to Mr. Bolton's confirmation hearings, and, after that, his performance at the United Nations, where he will undoubtedly do a fine job continuing the Bush administration's charm offensive with the rest of the world.
Which leaves us wondering what Mr. Bush's next nomination will be. Donald Rumsfeld to negotiate a new set of Geneva Conventions? Martha Stewart to run the Securities and Exchange Commission? Kenneth Lay for energy secretary?
The New York Times
March 9, 2005
EDITORIAL
The World According to Bolton
On Monday, President Bush nominated John Bolton, an outspoken critic of multinational institutions and a former Jesse Helms protégé, to be the representative to the United Nations. We won't make the case that this is a terrible choice at a critical time. We can let Mr. Bolton do it for us by examining how things might look if he had his way:
The United States could resolve international disputes after vigorous debate with ... itself. In an interview in 2000 on National Public Radio, Mr. Bolton told Juan Williams, "If I were redoing the Security Council today, I'd have one permanent member because that's the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world."
"And that one member would be, John Bolton?" Mr. Williams queried.
"The United States," Mr. Bolton replied.
America could stop worrying about China ... In 1999, when he was senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Bolton wrote a column in The Weekly Standard advocating that the United States just go ahead and give Taiwan diplomatic recognition, despite the fact that this purely symbolic gesture was a point on which China had repeatedly threatened to go to war. He made this argument: "Diplomatic recognition of Taiwan would be just the kind of demonstration of U.S. leadership that the region needs and that many of its people hope for. ... The notion that China would actually respond with force is a fantasy, albeit one the Communist leaders welcome and encourage in the West."
... and North Korea. In 1999, Mr. Bolton told The Los Angeles Times: "A sounder U.S. policy would start by making it clear to the North that we are indifferent to whether we ever have 'normal' diplomatic relations with it, and that achieving that goal is entirely in their interests, not ours. We should also make clear that diplomatic normalization with the U.S. is only going to come when North Korea becomes a normal country."
U.N. dues? What U.N. dues? In 1997, Mr. Bolton wrote in a column in The Wall Street Journal that the United States isn't legally bound to pay its United Nations dues. "Treaties are 'law' only for U.S. domestic purposes," he said. "In their international operations, treaties are simply 'political' obligations."
And forget about the International Criminal Court. In 2000, Mr. Bolton told the House International Relations Committee: "Support for the International Criminal Court concept is based largely on emotional appeals to an abstract ideal of an international judicial system unsupported by any meaningful evidence and running contrary to sound principles of international crisis resolution."
We certainly look forward to Mr. Bolton's confirmation hearings, and, after that, his performance at the United Nations, where he will undoubtedly do a fine job continuing the Bush administration's charm offensive with the rest of the world.
Which leaves us wondering what Mr. Bush's next nomination will be. Donald Rumsfeld to negotiate a new set of Geneva Conventions? Martha Stewart to run the Securities and Exchange Commission? Kenneth Lay for energy secretary?
Monday, March 07, 2005
The New York Times > Opinion > Editorial: Hope in the Land of Dashed Hopes
The New York Times > Opinion > Editorial: Hope in the Land of Dashed Hopes
EDITORIAL
Hope in the Land of Dashed Hopes
For more than 40 years, the epitome of wasted potential and squandered opportunity in Africa has been Nigeria. From the time it gained independence from Britain in 1960, that behemoth of 137 million people has seemed to do its level best to fritter away every natural advantage. Given the second-highest proven oil reserves in Africa, Nigerian officials spent oil income on lavish estates in Europe instead of decent schools and water systems back home. The country that produced the Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka and arguably Africa's best author, Chinua Achebe, was better known for the cruel, thieving dictator Sani Abacha.
Now, "Nigeria is changing," says Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the country's finance minister. She suggested thinking of America and the West as the parent and Nigeria as the child: "If your child has been doing bad things - drug abuse or alcohol - and they come to you and say, 'My mother, I want to change; please help me,' would you say, 'No'? Would you say, 'You are hopeless; you can't change'?"
It's a tough question for anyone who has ever been assaulted at the airport in Lagos just trying to enter Nigeria, or hit up for a bribe by Nigerian government officials, or struck dumb at the sight of orphaned children drinking dirty water on the street. But if America and the developed world are serious about their stated intent to tackle poverty, most of which is in Africa, then they cannot ignore the home of 20 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's people.
Hard as it is to believe, there are hopeful signs in Nigeria. The Nigerians, through two, albeit flawed, democratic elections, have given themselves a reformist government with the right intentions. President Olusegun Obasanjo has taken up the mantle of anticorruption - or, at least, slightly reduced corruption. He established an Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, whose chairman, Alhaji Nuhu Ribadu, at risk to his life, has been terrifying current and former officials with his investigations. Already, two rear admirals have been convicted of helping to steal 11,000 barrels of oil. Some 130 customs officials have been fired.
Bunkering, the quaint term Nigerians use to describe outright stealing of crude oil by members of the armed forces or the government, has been reduced to a mere 20,000 barrels a day from 100,000 barrels a day, according to Dr. Okonjo-Iweala. And finally - this should please all of us who have received e-mail supposedly from Idi Amin's son or Charles Taylor's wife offering untold riches if we'd only provide our checking account numbers - three purported e-mail crime leaders have been arrested.
Beyond the fight against corruption, Nigeria has made huge strides in promoting regional security. Nigerian peacekeepers are in Liberia, Sudan and Sierra Leone. Last month, when Togo installed the son of the country's longtime strongman as president, it was Nigeria's Mr. Obasanjo who led the fight that ultimately forced Faure Gnassingbé to step down. We can't help but notice the difference between Mr. Obasanjo and the leader of black Africa's other regional power, South Africa. Thabo Mbeki has largely thrown up his hands in the struggle to force Zimbabwe to hold honest elections that could rid it of the odious despot Robert Mugabe.
What's missing is for America to take Nigeria more seriously, to do much more than simply treat the country as a gas station. The United States has made some strides with H.I.V.-AIDS treatment in Nigeria, but that should be expanded to include prevention as well. The country isn't anywhere close to qualifying for aid under President Bush's Millennium Challenge Account, which ties money to good governance. But that approach, while worthy, condemns the 80 million Nigerians who subsist on barely anything. America should supplement the Challenge Account program with something that encourages countries like Nigeria to press ahead with reforms, and find ways - perhaps through private aid groups - to funnel money to the desperately poor. Nigeria is too big to ignore. If it doesn't succeed, it's hard to imagine that the rest of Africa has much of a chance.
EDITORIAL
Hope in the Land of Dashed Hopes
For more than 40 years, the epitome of wasted potential and squandered opportunity in Africa has been Nigeria. From the time it gained independence from Britain in 1960, that behemoth of 137 million people has seemed to do its level best to fritter away every natural advantage. Given the second-highest proven oil reserves in Africa, Nigerian officials spent oil income on lavish estates in Europe instead of decent schools and water systems back home. The country that produced the Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka and arguably Africa's best author, Chinua Achebe, was better known for the cruel, thieving dictator Sani Abacha.
Now, "Nigeria is changing," says Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the country's finance minister. She suggested thinking of America and the West as the parent and Nigeria as the child: "If your child has been doing bad things - drug abuse or alcohol - and they come to you and say, 'My mother, I want to change; please help me,' would you say, 'No'? Would you say, 'You are hopeless; you can't change'?"
It's a tough question for anyone who has ever been assaulted at the airport in Lagos just trying to enter Nigeria, or hit up for a bribe by Nigerian government officials, or struck dumb at the sight of orphaned children drinking dirty water on the street. But if America and the developed world are serious about their stated intent to tackle poverty, most of which is in Africa, then they cannot ignore the home of 20 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's people.
Hard as it is to believe, there are hopeful signs in Nigeria. The Nigerians, through two, albeit flawed, democratic elections, have given themselves a reformist government with the right intentions. President Olusegun Obasanjo has taken up the mantle of anticorruption - or, at least, slightly reduced corruption. He established an Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, whose chairman, Alhaji Nuhu Ribadu, at risk to his life, has been terrifying current and former officials with his investigations. Already, two rear admirals have been convicted of helping to steal 11,000 barrels of oil. Some 130 customs officials have been fired.
Bunkering, the quaint term Nigerians use to describe outright stealing of crude oil by members of the armed forces or the government, has been reduced to a mere 20,000 barrels a day from 100,000 barrels a day, according to Dr. Okonjo-Iweala. And finally - this should please all of us who have received e-mail supposedly from Idi Amin's son or Charles Taylor's wife offering untold riches if we'd only provide our checking account numbers - three purported e-mail crime leaders have been arrested.
Beyond the fight against corruption, Nigeria has made huge strides in promoting regional security. Nigerian peacekeepers are in Liberia, Sudan and Sierra Leone. Last month, when Togo installed the son of the country's longtime strongman as president, it was Nigeria's Mr. Obasanjo who led the fight that ultimately forced Faure Gnassingbé to step down. We can't help but notice the difference between Mr. Obasanjo and the leader of black Africa's other regional power, South Africa. Thabo Mbeki has largely thrown up his hands in the struggle to force Zimbabwe to hold honest elections that could rid it of the odious despot Robert Mugabe.
What's missing is for America to take Nigeria more seriously, to do much more than simply treat the country as a gas station. The United States has made some strides with H.I.V.-AIDS treatment in Nigeria, but that should be expanded to include prevention as well. The country isn't anywhere close to qualifying for aid under President Bush's Millennium Challenge Account, which ties money to good governance. But that approach, while worthy, condemns the 80 million Nigerians who subsist on barely anything. America should supplement the Challenge Account program with something that encourages countries like Nigeria to press ahead with reforms, and find ways - perhaps through private aid groups - to funnel money to the desperately poor. Nigeria is too big to ignore. If it doesn't succeed, it's hard to imagine that the rest of Africa has much of a chance.
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